What is your clear desired end state?
Suggested Reading
FM 5-0, Planning and Orders Production
Chapter 4, pages 55-67 based on printed document (PDF pages 67-88)
US Army instructions on when and how to use Army Design Methodology
Connected Study: Slowing Down to Speed Up
All excerpts below are from FM 5-0 unless otherwise noted
Introduction
4-2. Army design methodology is a methodology for applying critical and creative thinking to understand, visualize, and describe problems and approaches to solving them (ADP 5-0). It entails framing an operational environment (OE), framing problems, and developing an operational approach to solve or manage identified problems. ADM results in an improved understanding of an OE, a problem statement, and an operational approach that serves as the link between conceptual and detailed planning.
4-36. ADM includes interconnected activities that aid in conceptual planning and the application of operational art. There is no one way or prescribed set of steps to employ ADM. However, several activities associated with ADM include—
Framing an OE.
Framing problems.
Developing an operational approach.
Transitioning to detailed planning.
Reframing.
4-50. The commander and planning team envision the desired end state based on higher echelon guidance, the current state of an OE, and alternative future states of an OE. The operation’s end state is a set of desired conditions that, if achieved, meet the objectives of policy, orders, guidance, and directives issued to the commander. A desired condition is a sought-after future state of an OE. Conditions are tangible or intangible, military or nonmilitary, or physical or psychological. When determining desired end-state conditions, the team also considers available resources to ensure end-state conditions are feasible.
4-58. A technique for identifying problems begins with two questions:
What is the difference between the current state of the OE and the desired end state?
What is preventing the force from reaching the desired end state?
What is your clear desired end state?
Does your strategic planning process fragment ADM activities instead of integrating them?
When has collaborative thinking with your partner or family changed a major decision?
This Week’s Reading, Abridged
4-62. The planning team captures its work in a problem frame that describes the set of interrelated problems or system of problems in a narrative supported by visual models. The problem frame supports the commander’s dialogue with higher echelon commanders and unified action partners in defining problems and developing common expectations regarding resolution. This is vital to develop an effective operational approach to solve or manage identified problems.
4-64. Once commanders and planners agree on the problem or set of problems, they develop ways to address them. They do this by developing an operational approach—a description of the broad actions the force must take to transform current conditions into those desired at end state. An operational approach is the commander’s visualization of what needs to be done to solve or manage identified problems. It is the main idea that informs detailed planning. The operational approach promotes mutual understanding and unity of effort between the force and unified action partners on the way ahead.
4-66. An operational approach is not a course of action—a scheme developed to accomplish a mission (JP 5-0). An operational approach provides focus and boundaries for the development of COAs during the MDMP. A COA is more detailed than an operational approach, including details such as task organization, unit boundaries, and tasks to accomplish.
4-67. Like the other activities of ADM, commanders collaborate and dialogue with their staffs, other commanders, and unified action partners as they formulate their operational approach. In developing their operational approach, commanders and planning teams synthesize early work concerning the OE, the problem, and the desired end state and seek to answer questions such as—
How to go from the existing conditions to the desired end state?
What obstacles or tensions exist between the two?
What broad actions help attain these conditions?
What type of resources are required?
What are the risks?
Do you have an operational approach or only courses of action?
What is your main idea informing your detailed planning?
4-68. While there is no prescribed set of steps to develop an operational approach, the commander and planning team use the elements of operational art to formulate their operational approach. Earlier in ADM, the planning team considered end-state conditions. When formulating an operational approach, the commander and planning team consider centers of gravity, decisive points, objectives, lines of operations, and phasing. The following activities help commanders and staffs apply the elements of operational art when formulating an operational approach:
Determine enemy and friendly center of gravity.
Identify decisive points.
Determine a direct or indirect approach.
Establish objectives and devise lines of operations and lines of effort.
Refine the operational approach.
Document results.
4-70. Once identified, planners further analyze centers of gravity within a framework of three critical factors—capabilities, requirements, and vulnerabilities:
Critical capabilities are the primary capabilities essential to the achievement of the objective.
Critical requirements are essential conditions, resources, and means the center of gravity requires to perform the critical capability.
Critical vulnerabilities are those aspects or components of critical requirements that are deficient or vulnerable to direct or indirect attack in a manner achieving decisive or significant results.
4-72. Decisive points are not centers of gravity; they are keys to attacking or protecting them. Some decisive points are geographic. Some examples of decisive points include port facilities, distribution networks and nodes, and bases of operations. Events and elements of an enemy force are decisive points. An example of an enemy element might be the commitment of the enemy operational reserve. An example of an event is the reopening of a major oil refinery. A common characteristic of decisive points is their importance to a center of gravity. A decisive point’s importance requires the enemy to commit significant resources to defend it. The loss of a decisive point weakens a center of gravity and may expose more decisive points.
What are the centers of gravity that are critical to your desired end state?
How should you think about decisive points when you are not actually attacking or defending but merely navigating life?
4-73. Based on an understanding of centers of gravity and decisive points, commanders and staffs consider an approach to contend with a center of gravity. There are two approaches: direct or indirect. The direct approach attacks the enemy’s center of gravity or principal strength by applying combat power directly against it. However, centers of gravity are well protected and are not normally vulnerable to a direct approach. Thus, commanders often choose an indirect approach. The indirect approach attacks the enemy’s center of gravity by applying combat power against a series of decisive points while avoiding enemy strength. Both approaches use combinations of defeat or stability mechanisms, depending on the situation. Defeat and stability mechanisms are not tactical missions; rather, these mechanisms describe broad operational and tactical effects.
4-75. Army forces at all echelons use combinations of four defeat mechanisms:
Destroy.
Dislocate.
Disintegrate.
Isolate.
4-76. A stability mechanism is the primary method through which friendly forces affect civilians in order to attain conditions that support establishing a lasting, stable peace. As with defeat mechanisms, combinations of stability mechanisms produce complementary and reinforcing effects that accomplish the mission more effectively and efficiently than single mechanisms do alone. The four stability mechanisms are—
Compel.
Control.
Influence.
Support.
4-78. Normally, there are more decisive points in an operational area than can be attacked, seized, retained, controlled, or protected by available forces and capabilities. Accordingly, planners study and analyze decisive points and determine which offer the best opportunities to attack the adversary’s centers of gravity, extend friendly operational reach, or enable the application of friendly forces and capabilities. The art of planning includes selecting decisive points that best lead to creating end-state conditions in a sequence that most quickly and efficiently leads to mission success. Once identified for action, decisive points become objectives. … Combined with end-state conditions, objectives form the building blocks for developing lines of operation and lines of effort.
How do you identify decisive points in your competitive landscape before competitors?
Which mechanisms does your competitive strategy systematically underutilize?
How do you prioritize decisive points when there are so many from which to choose?
4-80. While an operational approach is broad, it describes the commander’s visualization in time, space, and purpose. It also addresses resources required to support the operational approach and accounts for risk. After forming a framework for the operational approach using lines of operations and lines of effort, commanders and planning teams consider additional elements of operational art to refine the operational approach. Additional elements of operational art to consider include—
Operational reach, basing, and culmination.
Tempo.
Phasing and transitions.
Risk.
4-81. Operational reach is the distance and duration across which a force can successfully employ its capabilities. The skillful positioning of forces, reserves, bases, and equipment extend operational reach. Although reach might be constrained or limited by the geography, enemy forces, and adversaries in and around an operational area, reach is extended by—
Forward positioning of capabilities and resources.
Increasing the range and effectiveness of weapons systems.
Leveraging host-nation support and contract support.
4-83. Commanders consider culmination when developing their operational approach and visualizing resources to support it. Culmination is that point in time and space at which a force no longer possesses the capability to continue its current form of operations. Culmination means a shift in relative combat power. It is relevant to both attackers and defenders at each level of warfare. While conducting offensive tasks, the culminating point occurs when the force cannot continue the attack, and it assumes a defensive posture or executes an operational pause. While conducting defensive tasks, it occurs when the force cannot defend itself and withdraws or risks destruction. The culminating point is difficult to identify when forces conduct
4-84. Tempo is another element to consider when developing an operational approach. Tempo is the relative speed and rhythm of military operations over time with respect to the enemy. Tempo reflects the rate of military action. Controlling tempo helps commanders keep the initiative during combat operations or establish a sense of normalcy during humanitarian crises. During operations dominated by offensive and defensive tasks, commanders maintain a higher tempo than the enemy does; a rapid tempo overwhelms an enemy’s ability to counter friendly actions. Higher tempo is the key to achieving a temporal advantage during operations. During operations dominated by stability tasks, commanders control events and deny enemy forces positions of advantage. By acting faster than the situation deteriorates, commanders change the dynamics of a crisis and restore stability.
4-87. Phasing extends operational reach. Only when the force lacks the capability to accomplish the mission in a single action do commanders phase the operation. Each phase should—
Focus effort.
Concentrate combat power in time and space at a decisive point.
Accomplish its objectives deliberately and logically.
4-88. Transitions mark a change of focus between phases or between the ongoing operation and execution of a branch or sequel. Shifting priorities between the core competencies or among offensive, defensive, stability, and defense support of civil authorities tasks involve a transition. Transitions require planning and preparation before execution to maintain the momentum and tempo of operations. Forces are vulnerable during transitions and commanders establish clear conditions for execution.
4-89. Risk, uncertainty, and chance are inherent in all military operations. During ADM, it is important to identify and communicate risks to mission accomplishment. Part of developing an operational approach includes answering the question, “What is the chance of failure or unacceptable consequences in employing the operational approach?” Risks range from resource shortfalls to an approach that alienates a potential friendly actor.
Are you able to set your own tempo or are you reliant on others and circumstances? Why?
Do you think in phases or process steps? How does this influence your operational approach?
How do you prevent exposing your organization to risk when developing transition planning?
4-91. A critical aspect of ADM is transferring the understanding and knowledge developed during ADM to others on the staff; subordinate, adjacent, and higher echelon commanders; and unified action partners. The goal of documenting the results of ADM is to capture the tacit knowledge gained during ADM and convert it into explicit knowledge for others to apply. Tacit knowledge resides in an individual’s mind, while explicit knowledge consists of written or otherwise documented information. Explicit knowledge products of ADM include—
Environmental frame.
Problem frame.
Operational approach.
Initial commander’s intent.
Planning guidance including operational timings, resources requirements in broad terms, and risk.
Reframing criteria.
4-95. A reframe is a shift in understanding that leads to a new perspective on the problem or its resolution. Reframing is the activity of revisiting earlier design hypotheses, conclusions, and decisions that underpin the current operational approach. In essence, reframing reviews what the commander and staff believe they understand about the OE, the problem, and the desired end state. At any time during the operations process, the decision to reframe may be triggered by factors such as—
Assessment reveals a lack of progress or regression.
Key assumptions prove invalid.
Unanticipated success or failure.
A major event that causes “catastrophic change” in the OE.
A scheduled periodic review that shows a problem.
A change in mission, objectives, or end state issued by higher echelon authority.
4-96. During operations, commanders decide to reframe after realizing the desired conditions have changed, are not achievable, cannot be attained through the current operational approach, or because of change of mission or end state. Reframing provides the freedom to operate beyond the limits of any single perspective. Conditions will change during execution, and such changes are expected because forces interact within an OE. Recognizing and anticipating these changes is fundamental to ADM and essential to an organization’s ability to learn.
4-98. It is helpful to think in advance about what circumstances, events, or changes require the command to reframe. As such, commanders and planning teams develop reframing indicators. A reframing indicator helps identify a condition in an OE that has changed or that could cause a shift in the problem such that a current operational approach may no longer be valid. … Reframing indicators support the commander’s ability to understand, learn, adapt, and reframe as necessary. Examples of such information include—
Changes in the original problem statement.
Significant changes in threat composition.
Significant changes in the threat’s approach.
Significant changes in friendly capability.
Higher echelon headquarters’ policy changes or directives that change the desired end state.
Unexpected lack of friendly progress toward objectives.
Shifts in international support or domestic will.
Key assumptions prove to be invalid.
4-99. The assessment plan incorporates reframing criteria in the form of measures of effectiveness (MOEs) and measures of performance (MOPs) that are used to evaluate completed tasks, achieved objectives, and obtained end-state conditions. An effective assessment plan incorporates the logic used to build the plan. The logic as to why the commander believes the actions in the plan will produce the desired results is an important consideration when developing the assessment plan. Recording and understanding this logic during ADM helps the staff recommend the appropriate indicators for assessing the operation. It also helps the commander and staff determine if they need to reframe the problem if assumptions prove false or the logic behind the plan appears flawed as operations progress.
What are your reframing indicators and do you acknowledge them?
What mechanisms prevent you from acknowledging when your approach is not working?
What is your clear desired end state?
Questions for Individual Reflection
When does your personal strategy waste resources on direct confrontation instead of exploiting systematic vulnerabilities?
Reframing indicators often are not included in executive information because they trigger near-term reframing. What early warning signals do you systematically ignore? When is this helpful, when is it not?
How do you identify when your operational approach has reached its culmination point?
When did reframing a problem completely change your understanding of the solution required?
Military planners identify natural tendencies that have momentum and are difficult to change. What forces are you fighting instead of leveraging because they contradict a closely-held narrative?
Professional Discussion Prompts
Which systemic problems does your organization or industry avoid discussing explicitly in strategic planning? Why?
How do functional silo structures prevent your organization from understanding problem interconnectedness?
How often does your organization pursue disconnected initiatives that do not reinforce each other? What is the remedy?
Which competitor behavior changes should trigger fundamental strategy revision or reframing in your organization?
How (and how often) does your organization track whether strategic assumptions remain valid?
Personal Discussion Prompts
How do you handle interconnected personal and professional challenges when it feels easier to address them separately?
How does your socioeconomic background frame problems in ways that exclude other perspectives?
Which personal beliefs about success and relationships have you never subjected to fundamental reconsideration?
When do you seek outside perspectives on problems you think you understand?
How do you handle the tension between individual goals and family systems?
Exercises
Narrative Deconstruction
Exercise:
Each individual identifies the dominant narrative their organization tells about itself and then deconstructs it using ADM methodology.
Analysis should account for alternative narratives from different stakeholder perspectives.
Examine how narrative choice constrains or enables strategic options.
Debrief:
Which elements of your organizational narrative are mythology rather than analysis?
How do competing stakeholder narratives reveal strategic options your current story obscures?
What would happen if your organization operated from a fundamentally different narrative about its purpose?
Visual Thinking Challenge
Exercise:
Each individual creates influence diagrams and causal loop diagrams for a complex business challenge they are currently facing.
Must use visual modeling to identify relationships not apparent through traditional analysis.
Present visual models without explanatory text to test clarity of thinking.
Debrief:
Which relationships became visible only through graphic modeling that conversations had missed?
How does visual thinking reveal assumptions embedded in your analytical process?
What resistance would you face introducing visual modeling tools into your organization's planning culture?
Feel free to borrow this with pride and use with your teams, professionally or personally. If you do, please let me know how it went and tips for improvement: matt @ borrowingwithpride.com